Mach One 6-2-23 How to Win Part 3

“Walks + Errors = 5 or Less Follow Up”

One of the biggest misnomers I see in baseball today is the thinking that walks and errors are these counterproductive anomalies that occur independently. From the department of “everything in moderation” comes the adage that a walk can be a successful tool for a pitcher. Lead-off doubles happen. Sometimes you have a base free and a guy in that other dugout circled as “the one who we cannot allow to beat us.” There is such a thing as the intentional base on balls for a reason. But what we must first grasp is why we have a cap on walks, as a goal for our program, and how pitching around a hitter is the exception, with pitching to contact being the overriding rule.

Generally speaking, a pitcher chalks up walks as what he can control, but the errors are the onus of others around him. This is the fundamental thinking that needs to change. Treating teammates as scapegoats is never the way to effectively (or maturely) pitch. The criticism that Johnny’s miscue forced you to unnecessarily stay on the mound to record a “fourth out” is not always fair. That is to say, the criticism is a two-way street, so tread with caution. Should the circumstances be applicable, Little Johnny has every right to quip back, “If one out of every 20 pitches was actually put in play, I wouldn’t be asleep over here at third.” Never assign blame as a pitcher. It is cowardly to treat umpires and your own players like they are sabotaging your efforts. 

As players in our program reach the next level, they need to understand that A) walks and errors are two inevitabilities of baseball. Mistakes on the micro scale are what make the sport unique, so there is no need for any player to beat themselves up over either. And B) the two types of gaffes are tied together in a way that pitchers can dictate. At the very least, a pitcher can put his defenders (himself being on e of them) in the best position to succeed defensively by throwing strikes. Activating the defense draws their full attention to the plate with every pitch; it has fielders eager to receive their next chance, and has players more mentally prepared for where the play will take place before the various scenarios even arise. 

Pitchers need to assume a larger accountability in how a low strike percentage affects others around them. Errors occur due to a lack of concentration and/or an elevated stress level of the situation. Sometimes the moment can become “too big” for the player to handle, doubt creeps in, the mind no longer becomes proactive as to where to go with the ball-if hit to them-but reactive, and mistakes happen. These moments commonly occur when runners are on base, when the defense has not been tested yet. Infielders typically want a low-pressure ground ball in the early innings to get into the flow of the game. Not too many players want their first chance of the game to come with runners on first and second via back-to-back walks. Ballplayers require the sound of bat hitting a ball-even if the play is to another teammate-in order to almost relearn the established pace of the game. Without that subtle noise to cue the timing, pressure builds. Missteps are more prevalent when an untested fielder has scoring implications riding on his first assist, or put-out, of the game.  

For Major League Baseball precedence on this topic, I like to use the 2004 and 2005 seasons by former Cy Young winner, Brandon Webb. He was a tremendously successful sinkerball pitcher, but a person with flawed mechanical issues that cut his career pointlessly short (a topic for another day). In 2004, before really reaching the peak of his career, Webb walked 119 batters. This was one of the highest walk totals for a single-season by a picture in the modern era-third most this century.  So what did this astonishingly high number of walks translate to, in terms of end-of-season statistics? Webb posted a 3.59 (NL Average that year: 4.31), a 1.51 WHIP (not great), and 7.1 strikeouts per nine innings (a solid SO/9 rate). For all intensive purposes, Webb had an above-average season. But he finished with a record of 7-16. Say what you want about a pitcher’s win/loss record, but I think it still has merit. And in this case, it was telling of what 119 walks-and 11 HBPs-do to your team’s chances of winning baseball games.

The proof is in what happened that 2005 season for Brandon Webb. He put up an almost identical 3.54 ERA and 6.8 SO/9, but cut his walk total down from 119 to 59. A sixty walk disparity in back-to-back seasons by the same pitcher is unheard of. So what changed? His personal winning percentage saw an 11-win swing: 14-12 record. His WHIP dropped to 1.26 and his Opponent’s Batting Average fell from .353 to .311-despite giving up 35 more hits (an average of one more per start). This is what young pitchers need to understand. Webb gave up more hits in 2005 than in 2004, but hitters’ success rate dropped. Live around the strike zone and, yes, batters will hit you more. But remember that at-bats are isolated, individual battles; the bigger picture victory is having the collective group in the opposition’s dugout reach base less. If given the choice between surrendering one more hit per game or handing out one more walk per game, the statistics reflect base runners be via a free pass score more often.

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